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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
             
 
 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 Applicants for social security disability payments, most of 
whom are truly ill or disabled, are entitled to be treated with 
respect and dignity no matter what the merits of their respective 
claims.  This is especially so at a time they are most vulnerable 
when representing themselves or being represented by lay-persons.  
Notwithstanding and recognizing the time pressures imposed upon 
those hearing the huge volume of such claims, rudeness, 
impatience, or outright bias cannot be tolerated.  We hold that 
  
claimant in the instant case did not receive the full and fair 
hearing to which he was entitled.  Accordingly, we remand the 
case for a new hearing before another administrative law judge. 
 
 I. 
 
 Stephen Ventura ("claimant") applied for disability 
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 401-433 (West 1991), alleging disability because of 
back injuries.  The state agency handling claimant's application 
denied his claim initially and upon reconsideration.  Claimant 
requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ").  
The ALJ issued a decision finding claimant able to work.  The 
Appeals Council, however, vacated the decision of the ALJ and 
remanded the case for a new hearing because the ALJ had taken the 
testimony of a medical expert and a vocational expert outside the 
presence of claimant.  After holding a new hearing, the ALJ found 
that although the medical evidence established that claimant had 
musculoskeletal difficulty with situational anxiety and 
depression, the evidence did not demonstrate that claimant had 
either a physical or mental impairment which would prevent him 
from performing the light work identified by the vocational 
expert.  The Appeals Council denied claimant's request for review 
of the ALJ's decision.  Claimant sought judicial review of the 
Secretary's final administrative decision in district court 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West 1991).  The district court 
granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment.  Claimant 
  
filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). 
        
 II. 
 
 Congress provided for judicial review of the Secretary's 
decisions adverse to a claimant for social security benefits.  42 
U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West 1991).  "'Our standard of review, as was 
the district court's, is whether the Secretary's decision is 
supported by substantial evidence in the record.'"  Adorno v. 
Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Allen v. Bowen, 
881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Substantial evidence is "more 
than a mere scintilla.  It means such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate."  Richardson v. 
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison 
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).  However, it is the 
conduct of the hearing, not the content of the evidence, which is 
the subject of our focus here. 
 In the instant appeal, claimant contends that he did not 
receive a full and fair hearing because of the ALJ's bias or 
prejudice.  In Hummel v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1984), we 
held that the administrative regulation providing for 
disqualification of administrative law judges contemplates that 
judicial review of bias claims take place in review proceedings 
under § 405(g).  736 F.2d at 94.  Therefore, we will consider 
claimant's bias claim, and, for reasons to be discussed, remand 
the case for a new hearing.  In light of our decision to grant a 
  
new hearing, we need not address the question of whether the 
Secretary's decision on the merits of the disability claim is 
supported by substantial evidence in the record.  See Hummel, 736 
F.2d at 95 (holding that although Secretary's decision was 
supported by substantial evidence in record, claimant was 
entitled to have evidence evaluated by unbiased adjudicator). 
    
 III. 
 
 The Social Security Act gives those claiming disability 
benefits a right to a hearing in which witnesses may testify and 
evidence may be received.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(b)(1) (West 
1991).  The hearing should be "understandable to the layman 
claimant, should not necessarily be stiff and comfortable only 
for the trained attorney, and should be liberal and not strict in 
tone and operation."  Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400-01.  Although 
the hearing is informal in nature, due process requires that any 
hearing afforded claimant be full and fair.  Id. at 401-02.  
Additionally, the Social Security Act and its corresponding 
regulations provide for fair procedures.  See Hess v. Secretary 
of Health, Education and Welfare, 497 F.2d 837, 840-841 (3d Cir. 
1974); Rosa v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 782, 783 (D.N.J. 1988). 
 Essential to a fair hearing is the right to an unbiased 
judge.  Hummel, 736 F.2d at 93.  The due process requirement of 
an impartial decisionmaker is applied more strictly in 
administrative proceedings than in court proceedings because of 
the absence of procedural safeguards normally available in 
  
judicial proceedings.  Id. at 93.  With respect to the 
disqualification of an ALJ, the Secretary has enacted regulations 
which provide that: 
 An administrative law judge shall not conduct a hearing 
if he or she is prejudiced or partial with respect to 
any party or has any interest in the matter pending for 
decision. 
20 C.F.R. § 404.940, 416.1440 (1994).  The claimant must bring 
any objections to the attention of the ALJ, and the ALJ shall 
decide whether to continue the hearing or withdraw.  Id.  The 
regulations provide that if the ALJ does not withdraw, the 
claimant may present objections to the Appeals Council as reasons 
why the hearing decision should be revised or a new hearing held 
before another ALJ.  Id.   
 The right to an unbiased ALJ is particularly important 
because of the active role played by ALJs in social security 
cases.  See Hess, 497 F.2d at 840-841.  ALJs have a duty to 
develop a full and fair record in social security cases.  See 
Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 934 (11th Cir. 1995); Smith v. 
Harris, 644 F.2d 985, 989 (3d Cir. 1981).  Accordingly, an ALJ 
must secure relevant information regarding a claimant's 
entitlement to social security benefits.  Hess, 497 F.2d at 841.  
In Hess we reasoned that "[a]lthough the burden is upon the 
claimant to prove his disability, due regard for the beneficent 
purposes of the legislation requires that a more tolerant 
standard be used in this administrative proceeding than is 
applicable in a typical suit in a court of record where the 
adversary system prevails."  Id. at 840. 
  
 The claimant in the instant case has abided by the 
procedures set forth in the regulations regarding 
disqualification of ALJs.  At the hearing held on February 23, 
1994, claimant's lay representative alleged that the ALJ was 
prejudiced and requested that he disqualify himself.  Tr. at 
135.1  The ALJ refused without explanation.  Id.  The Appeals 
Council also rejected claimant's bias charge, similarly without 
explanation.  Tr. at 7.  Finally, the district court devoted one 
sentence to this issue stating that: "After a careful review of 
the record there is simply no evidence to support [claimant's] 
allegations of bias or interference."  Ventura v. Shalala, No. 
94-111-JLL, slip op. at 13 (D. Del. Sept. 13, 1994).   
 We too have carefully examined the record and conclude that 
the ALJ's treatment of claimant and his lay representative was 
unacceptable and violated claimant's right to a full and fair 
hearing.  The following are revealing excerpts from the 
transcript of the hearing. 
 The ALJ demonstrated early on in the hearing his impatience 
and hostility towards claimant's lay representative. 
 ALJ: I thought you weren't going to ask leading 
questions? 
 
 Representative ("Rep."):  Well, your Honor, I -- 
 
 ALJ: Well what? 
 
 Rep.:  I guess I, I, I -- 
 
 ALJ: I guess you did, didn't you?  Why don't you try 
another way of doing it. 
 
                     
 
   1 "Tr." refers to the Administrative Transcript. 
  
 Rep.:  All right, sir.  Your Honor, it's obvious my 
client is in severe discomfort, and his, his ability to 
concentrate and respond, sometimes he needs a little 
edging. 
 
 ALJ: That's what you call a leading statement.  Why 
don't you just ask the questions. 
 
 Rep.:  Do you ever have a discomfort -- 
 
 ALJ: Now I think I'll address your characterization of 
your client being in significant discomfort.  I don't 
see it's -- go ahead.  And you put that on the record 
to see if you could establish that on the record he was 
in severe discomfort at the hearing.  I don't see it.  
So you see it.  Go ahead.  We see different things. 
Tr. at 142. 
 The ALJ subsequently interrupted claimant's description of 
his back pain in order to question claimant concerning his lack 
of representation at an earlier hearing.  The following colloquy 
ensued: 
 Claimant: There have been four days in the last six 
years when I haven't had pain. 
 
 ALJ: How come you didn't tell me the truth about the 
attorneys? 
 
 Claimant: I told you every -- I answered every 
question. 
 
 ALJ: But what I asked you about the attorneys, you 
didn't tell me the truth.  You didn't tell me the truth 
about why they didn't want her sanctioned. 
 
 Claimant: Your -- I -- 
 
 ALJ: Why didn't you? That's what I'm asking. 
 
 Rep.: Answer the question. 
 
 Claimant: You know, I -- you know.  Are you the doctor? 
 
 ALJ: Answer my question. 
 
 Claimant: I will. 
  
 
 ALJ: Now.  Answer my question, sir. 
 
 Claimant: You think I'm going to be -- truly I'm sorry, 
but I'm not afraid.  I'm just not afraid. 
 
 ALJ: I don't care if your afraid or not.  Answer my 
question.  Why didn't you tell me the truth about the 
attorneys. 
Tr. at 143.  The ALJ finally gave claimant a chance to respond, 
and claimant simply repeated what he had told the ALJ at the last 
hearing--that he had no representative because the attorney he 
had contacted did not want to come to Philadelphia for the 
hearing.  Tr. at 144.  The ALJ's questioning of the claimant was 
coercive and intimidating, and totally irrelevant to the question 
of whether claimant was disabled.  Moreover, the ALJ appeared 
disinterested in claimant's description of his pain in violation 
of the duty to "give serious consideration to a claimant's 
subjective complaints of pain, even where those complaints are 
not supported by objective evidence."  Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 
1058, 1067 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 Furthermore, it is apparent from the ALJ's comments that as 
soon as an expert witness mentioned that claimant had attended a 
psychiatric clinic at a veterans' hospital, the ALJ hastily 
concluded that claimant's back pain was caused by a mental 
impairment.  Tr. at 170.  The ALJ then proceeded to interfere 
with the admission of evidence concerning the physical causes for 
claimant's pain, i.e. the opinion of claimant's treating 
physician.  The ALJ stubbornly focused on obtaining information 
from the veterans' hospital.  When claimant's representative 
  
attempted to redirect the ALJ's attention to the opinion of 
claimant's treating physician, he was censured by the ALJ who 
stated: 
 ALJ: Tell you what, if I throw him out, he has nothing.  
How does that grab you?  I want to see what the VA 
Center says.  Obviously, they've sent it to some type 
of physician or psychologist if he's had testing.  It's 
only going to help him.  It's not going to hurt him.  
What's the matter with you? 
 
Tr. at 172.  The ALJ continued to intimidate claimant's 
representative: 
 ALJ: . . . I'm not trying to hurt Mr. Ventura, but 
you're not doing one damn thing to help him.  So why 
don't you sit back and listen for a second. 
Tr. at 172.  The representative agreed to provide the ALJ with 
whatever information he wanted from the veterans' hospital and 
presented the ALJ with detailed information concerning claimant's 
visits to the veterans' hospital.  Tr. at 172-73.  However, the 
ALJ further reprimanded claimant's representative when he 
attempted to question the medical expert on the stand. 
 ALJ: First of all, you're trying to knock out evidence 
that's favorable to Mr. Ventura.  So wake up and smell 
the roses on this case.  His problem lies in the 
emotional area.   . . . 
Tr. at 174.  Claimant's representative again attempted to 
question the expert concerning the physical causes of claimant's 
back pain and again the ALJ reprimanded the representative 
preventing this line of questioning. 
 ALJ: Why are you reading this to death when I said that 
primarily if he's got this emotional condition as the 
VA Center seems to think he has, it's going to be 
beneficial to him?  Why are you trying to kill this 
  
thing on the physical when it's not going to matter to 
him? 
Tr. at 180.  The ALJ's continuous interference with the 
representative's introduction of evidence of the physical causes 
of claimant's back pain violated the ALJ's duty to develop the 
record fully and fairly and to consider seriously the findings of 
a treating physician.  See Mason, 994 F.2d at 1067.  Importantly, 
the representative had already provided the ALJ with information 
concerning claimant's visits to the veterans' hospital and had 
agreed to provide any additional information requested by the 
ALJ.  
 
 
 
 IV.    
 
 We now turn to the question of whether claimant is entitled 
to a new hearing because of the ALJ's conduct.  We hold that the 
ALJ's offensive conduct prevented claimant from receiving a full 
and fair hearing and, therefore, a new hearing must be held 
before another ALJ to determine whether claimant is entitled to 
disability benefits. 
   In Hummel, supra, a disability claimant appealed the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Secretary.  Claimant argued that the Secretary's decision was not 
supported by substantial evidence and, alternatively, that the 
district court erred in ruling on the Secretary's motion for 
  
summary judgment while her motions to compel discovery remained 
outstanding.  Hummel, 736 F.2d at 92.  These discovery requests 
sought information concerning the possible bias of the ALJ who 
presided at claimant's hearing.  Id.  We held that although the 
Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the 
record, claimant was entitled to have the evidence evaluated by 
an unbiased adjudicator.  Id. at 95.  We stressed that even if 
the record was totally devoid of evidence supporting a finding of 
disability, "the bias of the adjudicator might still be a ground 
for setting aside a determination adverse to the claimant, for we 
have repeatedly held that in Social Security disability claim 
hearings the administrative law judge has an affirmative 
obligation to assist the claimant in developing the facts."  Id. 
(citations omitted).  Furthermore, we stated that: "It is 
difficult to conceive of how a judge biased against disability 
claims or claimants could conscientiously perform that duty."  
Id. 
 In Hummel, we reversed the district court and instructed it 
to consider whether a remand to the Secretary for the taking of 
new evidence on the alleged bias of the ALJ was appropriate.  736 
F.2d at 95.  We noted that "[i]n the event that a finding of bias 
is made on remand, a new hearing must be held before an 
administrative law judge to determine the merits of Hummel's 
claim."  Id.  Additional discovery was necessary in Hummel 
because the alleged bias of the ALJ, which was discovered after 
the Secretary had entered its decision, arose from an 
extrajudicial source which required further investigation.  In 
  
contrast, the taking of new evidence is not necessary in the 
instant case because the ALJ's conduct at the hearing can be 
evaluated using the hearing transcript.   
 The district court's decision in Rosa v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 
782 (D.N.J. 1988), is instructive.  There, the district court 
addressed the issue of whether a disability claimant was accorded 
a full and fair hearing.  Id. at 783.  Upon reviewing the 
transcript of the hearing, the court found that claimant's 
hearing "was shameful in its atmosphere of alternating 
indifference, personal musings, impatience and condescension."  
Id.  The district court emphasized the importance of fair 
procedures: 
 This court has previously criticized this agency's 
heartlessness in the repeated and unfounded rejection 
of a multitude of clearly valid claims.  However, even 
in those cases, the unjust results followed seemingly 
adequate procedures.  In this matter there was not even 
the pretense of a full and fair hearing.  Once we 
foresake [sic] fairness and due process because of the 
pressure of heavy caseloads, then our system of justice 
will end.  Although administrative hearings are not 
formal trials, nor should they be so informal or 
limited that their fairness is destroyed. 
Id. at 785.  Accordingly, the district court vacated the decision 
of the Secretary and remanded the case for a full and fair 
hearing.  Id.  In this case, we do the same.  
 
 V. 
 
 Because of the ALJ's offensive and unprofessional conduct, 
claimant in the instant case did not receive the full and fair 
  
hearing to which he was entitled.  We hold, therefore, that 
claimant is entitled to a new hearing before another ALJ.  In 
light of our disposition of this case, we need not reach the 
merits of the other issues raised on appeal.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the Secretary and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
